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Constitutional Patriotism  
 
Constitutional patriotism: An overview 
Constitutional patriotism is a political theory that seeks to provide an explanation for the sense of ownership that 
most individuals have towards their national constitutional system. Specifically, constitutional patriotism assumes 
that free-thinking individuals involved in a discussion over the common good will reach an agreement that is 
perceived, at least by those involved in the debate, as having normative value. The awareness that such a deliberative 
process has historically been a part of the constitutional system also induces a sense of ownership of past historical 
accommodations of constitutional principles. The shared perception of being part of historically grounded institutions 
within a deliberative democracy is sometimes called the ‘normative surplus effect’ or ‘normative spill-over effect’ of 
the deliberative process. The theory, in its current form, was proposed by Jürgen Habermas and Jean-Werner Müller. 
 Debates over the common good might take place informally or within the state’s institutions. Pell-mell 
informal debates, with few exceptions, have a limited effect on amending constitutional norms. Yet, the prerogative 
to openly discuss laws and policies legitimised by constitutional norms is normally sufficient to develop an inner 
sense of belonging to a constitutional system. Deliberative debates within public institutions (e.g. parliaments and 
courts) are more likely to change the functioning of a constitutional system, but they are, by way of comparison to 
informal political discussions, normally constrained by the system of rules that regulate representative democracy 
and the administration of justice. Thus, the theory of constitutional patriotism provides an explanatory model for the 
historical development of a democratic constitutional system. 
 As one of the most persuasive explanatory theories of modern pluralist democracy, constitutional patriotism 
has attracted a series of well-articulated critiques. It has been suggested, for instance, that constitutional patriotism 
might not provide a plausible model of social integration for international organisations such as the European Union 
(EU). In this essay, I will provide an overview of the theory and a selection of its critiques.  
 
Theoretical assumptions and normative claims 
Constitutional patriotism assumes that a deliberative activity, between free members of the political community who 
intervene in public debates in good faith and who accept the persuasiveness of the best argument, will form a 
consensus over policies, the legitimacy of statutes and perhaps the normative values manifested in their constitutional 
text.  
 Drawing much of its epistemological strength from Kantian deontological thinking, constitutional patriotism 
proposes a theoretical justification for a democratic constitutional system without assuming the existence of a 
comprehensive theory of justice. It is a theoretical alternative to the concept of the nation-state, and it is widely 
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accepted as one of the most articulated theoretical explanations for the functioning of modern state institutions in 
modern diversified societies (Habermas 2004; Müller 2008; Sołtan 2008; Enns 2010; Khoo 2014; Hułas and Fel 
2015). One of the key features of constitutional patriotism is, for instance, the assumption that individuals are free to 
express their opinions – or to silently agree about the opinions of others – in a political debate. Discussions over the 
common good might take place anywhere within a political community. An informal discussion, for instance, among 
white-collar workers on the Clapham omnibus contributes to the layering of shared political opinions that might 
trickle into institutional debates. Institutional debates, whilst limited by the system of rules that allows for the 
functioning of modern mass democracy, might foster communal agreements over new policies and statutes. The 
general persuasiveness of decisions taken within institutions, due to the inherent imperfections of any deliberative 
activity (e.g. limited information), is transient. Past agreements will be reviewed by new political discussions and the 
process will start again. 
 Consequently, constitutional patriotism describes the dynamic connection between the daily deliberative 
activity that distinguishes large liberal democracies and public institutions. The daily plebiscite that generates a 
patriotic attachment between individuals and their legal system occurs within institutions in which a farrago of 
political opinions generates endless discussions (Habermas 1998, 3). Yet, constitutional patriotism does not explain 
the reasons (e.g. self-interest, religious beliefs etc.) that motivate individuals to engage in political debates; it assumes 
it as a social fact.  
  This process of the constant tuning of previous political agreements has two pragmatic effects. Firstly, over a 
period of time, unchallenged agreements over the ‘common good’ will become part of the shared cultural assets. For 
instance, the due process clause in the English Magna Carta (‘No man shall be arrested or imprisoned ... except by 
the lawful judgement of his peers or by the law of the land’) and the Scottish assertion of individual freedom as a 
self-evident prerogative (‘It is in truth not for glory, nor riches, nor honours that we are fighting, but for freedom 
alone, which no honest man gives up but with life itself’) are currently part of the UK’s constitutional culture (Breda 
2014).  
 Secondly, the process of discussing past and present political issues generates a sense of ownership of past and 
present current agreements. The ‘winners’ in a debate might recognize an overlap between their perception of what 
the common good entails and the procedural soundness of the debate that made their perception part of the legal 
system. The ‘losers’, who might strongly disagree with the outcome of a political debate, accept instead that the 
deliberative process has been open and objective. Müller describes constitutional patriotism as a ‘collective learning 
process’ where winners and losers accept that it is their daily political involvement (and not the outcome of 
individual discussions) that supports and legitimises the gamut of values, assumptions and prescriptions set in their 
constitutional system (2008, 85).  
 Thus, constitutional patriotism does not suggest a comprehensive theory akin to Rawls’s theory of political 
liberalism (Rawls 1972). Constitutional patriotism acknowledges, instead, the normative foundations of the modern 
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liberal democracy that we inherited from the Enlightenment (e.g. individual freedom and a commitment to pursue 
truth and justice) and the dynamic nature of the interpretations of those principles in a highly-diversified society 
(Habermas 1994, 11–12). Each individual, within a liberal constitutional polity, tacitly (or explicitly if he/she 
acquired citizenship as a result of prolonged migration) subscribes to the values supporting the constitution. 
 Whilst simple in its formulation, constitutional patriotism has the benefit of clarifying the often-muddled 
relationship between constitutional law and the role of the idea of national identity. For example, in Roper v 
Simmons, Justice Anthony Kennedy describes how citizens and the United States Supreme Court honour the 
American Constitution as an expression of a communal endeavour. Kennedy explains this process as follows: 
The document sets forth, and rests upon, innovative principles original to the American experience 
[…] These doctrines and guarantees are central to the American experience and remain essential to our 
present-day self-definition and national identity. Not the least of the reasons we honor the Constitution, 
then, is because we know it to be our own. It does not lessen our fidelity to the Constitution or our 
pride in its origins to acknowledge that the express affirmation of certain fundamental rights by other 
nations and peoples simply underscores the centrality of those same rights within our own heritage of 
freedom [My emphasis] (Roper v Simmons 2005, 578). 
This is, as worded by Justice Kennedy, a manifestation of a patriotic attachment made by the members of an 
institution, the Justices of the US Supreme Court, to the universal values manifested in the American constitutional 
system. Whilst carefully worded, the passage does not cover the tension between the universal values protected by 
the US Constitution and the reference to the Constitution as a distinctive asset of the American nation (whatever that 
might be). At a conceptual level, individual freedoms and human dignity are influential aspects in the development of 
modern democracy, but, as such, are considered ‘universal’ (Tully 2002). From Kennedy’s narrative, it is reasonable 
to subsume that, firstly, the US Supreme Court perceived those universal values as belonging to a national heritage, 
and, secondly, that their interpretation is an exclusive element of American institutional history. This effect is the so-
called normative spill-over (or normative sur-plus) of deliberative democracy (Müller 2007a, 49, 125, 147; Müller 
2008, 76–77).  
 To sum up, constitutional positivism proposes an elegantly simple solution to the dilemma of creating a 
community of strangers who are actively (or passively) involved in a daily deliberative activity. This endeavour is 
composed of minute public engagements with neighbouring individuals and of debates within democratic 
institutions. The side effect of these activities is the formation of communities that value the rules they inherited from 
previous generations (as eloquently defined by Justice Kennedy in Roper v. Simmons) and that have the possibility of 
amending these rules in a way that seeks to enhance the commonwealth. 
Constitutional patriotism: Recent critiques and developments 
The previous section proposed a general overview of the theory of constitutional patriotism. Most probably, it is an 
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explicative theory of the effects of deliberative democracy in modern constitutional polities. Constitutional patriotism 
assumes that freedom, deliberation and a commitment to rational and objective decisions will help in steering a 
community of citizens towards the common good. As one of the most persuasive contemporary political theories, 
constitutional patriotism has also attracted a fair amount of criticism (Canovan 2000; Michelman 2001; Laborde 
2002; Breda 2004; Kumm 2005). Given that the overarching aim of this Encyclopaedia is to seek to elucidate 
complex theoretical proposals and provide the reader with a springboard for further studies, this section will focus on 
a selection of critical engagements with the intention of clarifying the theoretical contribution that constitutional 
patriotism has made to the current understanding of the functioning of modern constitutional democracy. In 
particular, it will discuss the limits of constitutional patriotism in indirect democracies and in states that have not 
reached a level of political development that is essential in order to establish deliberative democracies. 
 A series of critiques will not be fully reviewed because they might misconstrue the theory of constitutional 
patriotism. Firstly, this short review of the critiques on constitutional patriotism will not consider those critiques that 
consider constitutional patriotism as a theory of justice. This is not one of the aims of constitutional patriotism 
(Müller 2009, 22). Freedom and equality are procedural requirements of deliberative democracy, as discussed 
elsewhere in the Encyclopaedia, and they overlap with liberal assumptions of modern liberal democracy, yet 
constitutional patriotism does not seek to be a normative justification for liberal democracy. 
 Secondly, constitutional patriotism does not justify the sense of ethnic ownership of the constitutional values 
manifested in the constitution (Kumm 2005; Müller 2006). Constitutional patriotism, at least the version considered 
in this essay, is not one of the manifestations of liberal nationalism. The supporters of this ‘thick’ constitutional 
patriotism assume, for instance, that there is a causal link between the historical development of the nation-state and 
the establishment of large, indirect, deliberative democracies (Miller 1995). Again, nationalism is discussed 
elsewhere in this Encyclopaedia. It is sufficient to say that whilst the nation-state developed during the Industrial Era 
and that period coincides with the establishment of constitutional democracies, claims that a national community 
might help the development of a parliamentary democracy in England or that national communities might endanger 
the development of modern democracies are equally misshaped (Smith 1971; Fukuyama 2012). However, 
constitutional patriotism elucidates how in open and culturally diversified deliberative democracies, individuals 
might perceive themselves as active parts of normative endeavours.  
 Thirdly, this introductory review will not consider the details of the critique which depicts constitutional 
patriotism as a form of civil religion (Breda 2004; Müller 2007b, 202). Müller argues, for instance, that constitutional 
patriotism might generate an uncritical acquiescence of inherited constitutional culture (2007b, 202). Inserting an a 
priori protection of identity-based communities, such as the freedom to manifest religious beliefs, which is already 
part of the constitutional assets of most liberal democracies, might be a sufficient safeguard against the potential 
homogenising effects of constitutional patriotism as civil religion. This is the solution adopted in consocionational 
political systems such as those found in Belgium, Northern Ireland and Myanmar (Wolff 2004). 
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 This summary of the critique review will focus instead on those critiques which question the procedural 
assumption of constitutional patriotism, since they question the theoretical soundness of a proposal. For instance, by 
making reference to the EU, where institutions such as the European Council (hereafter the Council) and the Council 
of Ministers are bound by a series of multiple commitments to the national cabinets, their parliaments and to the 
members of their respective constituencies (Müller 2007a, 94; Kumm 2008). In other words, the role of the Member 
States’ representatives as speakers within the Council is severely limited by the political mandate and thus 
agreements formed within those institutions are often the result of behind-closed-doors diplomatic discussions.  
 It could be argued that open, unbiased discussions are only an ideal epistemic requirement and thus that an 
individual speaker cannot ever be free in a way that meets with Kantian epistemic requirements. Constitutional 
patriotism assumes that free-thinking individuals who, in good faith, are involved in a discussion over the common 
good will form an agreement over some aspects of good communal life. An agreement over the effect of luck on the 
redistribution of individual gifts in modern capitalist societies, for instance, must be accompanied by some level of 
redistributive justice. Kumm argues that the setting of macro-policy decisions within the EU is so far removed from 
the actual requirements of an open discussion that the result of the institutional debates cannot be associated with a 
level of objectivity and rationality that is necessary to trigger a patriotic commitment (Kumm 2008; Breda 2015). The 
problematic issue of EU representation is discussed elsewhere in this Encyclopaedia, but it is sufficient to say that the 
Council’s policies are the result of carefully orchestrated diplomatic negotiations between sovereign states and that 
an agreement might be difficult to justify in universal terms. For instance, the policy of subsidizing EU farmers might 
reduce the level of competition and impoverish communities outside EU borders such as those in Northern Africa.  
 Indeed, it might be idealistic to expect that diplomatic negotiations are as open as informal chats between 
fellow commuters are, but Kumm’s critique shows a general limitation of the epistemic assumptions of constitutional 
patriotism. Modern democracy is an indirect democracy. If the institutional mandate is too narrow, it is illogical to 
assume that institutional agreements will generate a perception of objectivity and a shared sense of ownership of the 
decisions taken within that deliberative arena.  
 For analogous reasons, where there is a lack of freedom for those who intervene in institutional debates, 
constitutional patriotism might not provide an explanatory model for patrimonial political systems (Fukuyama 2012, 
129). The practice of patrimonialism, which originated in rural societies, included an informal vertical power relation 
between the power holder (e.g. the patron/landowner) and a number of inferiors such as temporary workers 
(Fukuyama 2014, 14, 86–104). For instance, a few European political systems show signs of the isomorphic mimicry 
of neo-patrimonial systems (Caciagli 2006). In this political system, patrimonialism is horizontal and might include a 
nationwide network of individuals that exchange tangible favours such as jobs, public contracts and political votes at 
the national level (Caciagli 2006, 159; Fukuyama 2012, 124). In a patrimonial system (and neo-patrimonial political 
systems), indirect representatives might refer to a general principle of good government such as the endorsement of 
the freedom of enterprise and public institutions might claim the cost-effective delivery of key services, yet the 
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majority of the population expects that politicians and civil servants will use their prerogative for their personal 
benefit and for the benefit of their clientele (Faure 2013, 5, 198). 
  It is important to remember that debates over the common good within a democratic society are, according to 
the theory of constitutional patriotism, a manifestation of a daily plebiscite between all members of the polity and 
their institutions (Habermas 1994, 3). More precisely, the theory of constitutional patriotism explains that discussions 
give individuals a sense of ownership of the general principles manifested in the constitution, as well as the rules that 
might trickle down based on those principles (Cohen and Sabel 1997).  
 The possibility of making sense of the communal ownership of past and current political decisions requires, 
however, a series of functioning modern institutions (Fukuyama 2012, 14). Thus, there is an overlap between the 
conditions necessary for the development of truly meaningful deliberative activities within an institutional setting and 
the inner workings of the state’s institutions. There is also a correlation between how public representatives form an 
agreement within an institution and the possibility that the process that forms such an agreement is perceived as 
objective and rational (Breda 2016). From Fukuyama’s analysis, it appears that many formally modern constitutional 
systems are de facto patrimonial political communities and, for these types of polities, constitutional patriotism might 
not provide an explicative working template. As was mentioned in the review of Kumm’s critique, it is idealistic to 
expect that debates will be set in optimal deliberative conditions and so it is unreasonable to expect that those 
participating in a debate are completely unbiased. However, the deliberative institutions’ main operating function in 
both patrimonial and neo-patrimonial political systems is to provide for their clientele. Representatives are expected 
to harvest the state’s resources (e.g. public contracts and jobs) and distribute them among the members of their 
fiefdoms. The ability to provide for the clientele is the rational criterion that is used to assess the representatives’ 
suitability for their post. It is reasonable to suggest that constitutional patriotism cannot provide a normative model 
for constitutional systems that have not reached the level of development that is necessary for a fully functioning 
deliberative democracy.  
 A summary 
This encyclopaedic entry provided a concise overview of the theory of constitutional patriotism and of the selection 
of its critiques. The first section focused on the general structure of the theory by looking at Müller and Habermas’s 
interpretation of constitutional patriotism. From the analyses of these two authors, it is reasonably clear that 
constitutional patriotism is a political theory which seeks to explain the epistemic structure of modern mass 
democracies. It assumes that in a free, open and socially diversified political system, individuals will interact with 
others in a way that seeks to find objective and rational agreements over the common good. 
  Constitutional patriotism has the benefit of explaining how informal and institutional debates among strangers 
are funnelled into local and national institutional discussions. Most of these debates are impromptu informal public 
discussions among family members, friends and strangers. A smaller number of these political discussions take place 
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within the state’s institutions. Cohen and Sabel’s analysis shows that individuals are involved in multiple, local 
deliberative activities and the debates generate a perception of ownership (or the desire distancing oneself from 
ownership) over commonly agreed policies. Thus, constitutional patriotism provides a theory that bridges the 
informal and formal debates over the common good. It also explains how current institutional debates, such as the 
one reported by Justice Kennedy in Roper v Simmons, consider the inherited constitutional principle as an essential 
normative asset of a constitutional system.  
 The second part of the essay reviewed some of the critiques against constitutional patriotism. It is possible to 
conceive that some of the pre-conditions for a patriotic constitutional system might be ill suited in explaining the 
workings of deliberative institutions within large international organisations such as the EU. It is also improbable that 
a sense of ownership of constitutional values would be perceived as a side effect of a deliberative activity within the 
patrimonial political system which has only formally embraced the supporting ideals (e.g. freedom, equality, 
objectivity and rationality) that we inherited from the Enlightenment.   
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